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STATEMENT FACTS 
Appellant, Embassy Group, Inc. (appellant) incorporates 
its statement of facts set forth in its initial Brief and stands by 
the accuracy of those facts. (AppelJ ant's Brief pp. 3-6). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANT MARSHALED ALL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT BEFORE 
DEMONSTRATING THAT THEY ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
In Argument I of their Brief, appeJ ] ees argi le appel ] ant 
has failed to marshal all the evidence in support of the Trial 
court's findings before demonstrating that the findings are clearly 
erroneous. Having failed to marshal all the evidence, the argument 
goes, this court should not disturb the Trial court's findings. 
Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989). However, appellees 
do little more than invoke the raarsnaJLing of evidence requirement 
and do not address appellants7 arguments with respect to each of 
the findings it claims are clearly erroneous. Appellant argues 
that four of the Trial court's specif i c Findings of Fact are 
clearly erroneous. Appellees simply claim appellant failed to 
marshal evidence and cite appellant's argument with respect to 
Finding of F'act No ; as an "examp] e" of appellant's failure to 
marshal. As shown below, appellant did marshal all evidence in 
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favor of Finding No. 7, and all evidence in favor of the other 
three findings appellant claims are clearly erroneous. 
In its initial Brief, appellant argued, in the following 
order, that the Trial court's findings Nos. 7, 14, 11 and 13 are 
clearly erroneous. Finding of fact No. 7 reads: 
7. All of the written documentation 
concerning the sale of Lot 33 to the 
defendants indicates that the purchase price 
was $40,000.00. 
(Tr. 172). Contrary to appellees7 argument, the only documents 
which contain a sale price for Lot 33 are two Earnest Money Sales 
Agreements, PI. Ex. 5 and PI. Ex. 6. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6 is 
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement which was ultimately executed by 
appellant and appellees. Both Earnest Money Sales Agreements 
provide that only "a portion" of Lot 33 was agreed to be sold to 
appellees for $40,000.00. (See Argument III, pp. 26-29 of 
Appellant's Brief) 
No other documents show a sale price for Lot 33. The 
Warranty Deed cited by appellees in their Brief, while conveying 
all of Lot 33, does not show a sale price. The Trust Deed Note and 
accompanying Trust Deed also cited by appellees do not show that 
the purchase price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00. The Note and Deed 
only show that the Hatches executed a Deed of Trust to all of Lot 
33 in favor of appellant to secure repayment on a Trust Deed Note 
in the amount of $20,000.00. Nowhere in the Note is it indicated 
that the purchase price for all of Lot 33 was $40,000.00. 
Appellant cited these same documents and made these same arguments 
in its initial Brief. 
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Appellee also cites to "Sellers Closing Statement", PI. 
Ex. 7; "Purchasers7 Closing statement" D. Ex. 1; "FSB Loan Proceeds 
Breakdown", D. Ex. 3; and "Title Insurance Policy", D. Ex. 2. It 
should be noted at the outset that none of these documents 
constitute a contract for the purchase of Lot 33. Again, the only 
documents constituting such a contract are the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreements which provided that only a portion of Lot 3 3 was to be 
purchased for $40,000.00. In any case, none of these four 
documents indicate the purchase price for all of Lot 33 was 
$40,000.00. The "Purchasers' Closing Statement" and "Seller's 
Closing Statement", D. Ex. 1 and PI. Ex. 7 respectively, simply 
indicate a purchase price of $40,000.00 for an address and not a 
lot number. Neither the "Title Insurance Policy" nor "FSB Loan 
Proceeds Breakdown", D. Ex. 2 and D. Ex. 3 respectively, contain a 
figure of $40,000.00 anywhere in the documents. Appellant cited 
these documents and made these same arguments in its initial Brief. 
(See Argument III pp. 26-29 of appellant's Brief). 
As to appellees' claim that the "trial transcript" is 
replete with testimony and evidence to support the Trial court's 
finding that the sale price of Lot 33 was $40,000.00", the Trial 
court's finding of fact No. 7 was that "the written documentation" 
indicated a purchase price of $40,000.00. Accordingly, the trial 
testimony as to the purchase price of Lot 33 is a irrelevant as it 
relates to Finding of Fact No. 7. 
Finding of Fact No. 14 reads: 
14. The Earnest Money Agreement and all the 
loan and closing documents prepared by the 
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plaintiffs indicate that the purchase price of 
Lot 33 was $40,000.00. 
(Tr. 173). 
As discussed above, both Earnest Money Sales Agreements 
provide for the sell of only a portion of Lot 3 3 for $40,000.00. 
That portion was described as .9992 acres in PI. Exs. 1 and 4. 
Also as discussed above, the loan and closing documents do not 
indicate the purchase price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00. Nowhere in 
either the Purchasers7 Statement or Sellers' Statement is there an 
indication that the purchase price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00. Nor 
do the loan documents referred to in Finding No. 14 indicate the 
purchase price for Lot 3 3 was $40,000.00. The documents, D. Exs. 
3 and 4, simply indicate appellant was to receive $20,000.00 from 
appellees' loan from First Security Bank and authorized such a 
disbursement. Accordingly, Finding of Fact No. 14 is clearly 
erroneous because neither the Earnest Money Sales Agreement nor 
loan and closing documents indicate the purchase price for Lot 33 
was $40,000.00. (See Argument III, pp. 26-29 of appellant's 
Brief). 
Finding of Fact No. 11 reads: 
11. The court also found defendant Maureen 
Hatch to be a credible and reliable witness 
particularly when she testified that it was 
her understanding that the cost of Lot 33 was 
$40,000.00. 
(Tr. 173). As argued in appellant's initial brief, at no time 
during Maureen Hatch's testimony did she testify it was her 
understanding the cost of Lot 33 was $40,000.00. Since Maureen 
Hatch never testified it was her understanding the cost of Lot 33 
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was $40,000,00, such a finding that she did so testify is clearly 
erroneous. Appellees do not cite any evidence to the contrary in 
their Response Brief. 
Finding of Fact No. 13 reads: 
13. The court is convinced that if defendant 
Daryl Hatch believed he was buying Lot 33 for 
$80,000.00, he would not have told his wife he 
was buying it for $40,000.00. 
(Tr. 173). As argued in appellant's initial Brief, at no point 
during Mr. Hatch's testimony did he testify he told his wife he was 
buying Lot 33 for $40,000.00. Nor, was there any other testimony 
at trial indicating Mr. Hatch told his wife he was buying Lot 33 
for $40,000.00. Since there is no testimony indicating Mr. Hatch 
told his wife he was buying Lot 33 for $40,000.00 a finding of fact 
that Mr. Hatch did make this statement is clearly erroneous. 
Again, appellees cite no contrary evidence in their Response Brief. 
II 
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
AS TO THE PURCHASE PRICE FOR LOT 33; NOR DID THE 
TRIAL COURT MAKE A FINDING THAT THE DOCUMENTATION 
ESTABLISHED SUCH A MEETING OF THE MINDS 
In Argument II of their Response Brief, appellees respond 
to appellant's Argument IA in its initial Brief where it was argued 
there was no meeting of minds as to the purchase price for all of 
Lot 33. Although appellees cite different cases and attempt to 
distinguish those cases cited by appellants, they nevertheless 
acknowledge that before there is an enforceable contract there must 
be a meeting of the minds between the parties thereto. Pinaree v. 
5 
Continental Group of Utah, Inc.. 558 P. 2d 13 17 (Utah 1975). 
Appellees make two arguments to support their claim that 
there was a meeting of the minds between appellant and appellees. 
First, appellees claim that if there was no meeting of the minds as 
to the terms of the parties' agreement in this case, "it would seem 
inconsistent that appellants would have directed the preparation of 
the closing documents as they did, and wholly implausible that they 
would execute and record them." Second appellees state that the 
"record and the exhibits received into evidence at trial clearly 
support the court's finding that the documentary evidence of this 
transaction contemplated a $40,000.00 purchase price." (Appellees' 
Response Brief p. 15-16). 
Neither of appellees arguments establish a meeting of the 
minds between appellant and appellees. First, whether or not 
appellant "directed the preparation of the closing documents", a 
proposition which is not clearly supported by the evidence, is 
irrelevant to whether there was a meeting of the minds between the 
parties as to the purchase price for Lot 33. As discussed in 
Argument I in this Brief and Argument IA of appellant's initial 
Brief, the only documents which contain a purchase price for Lot 33 
are the two Earnest Money Sales Agreements. (PI. Exs. 5 and 6). 
Again, both Earnest Money Sales Agreements provide that only "a 
portion" of Lot 3 3 was to be sold to appellees for $40,000.00. 
Second, the record and exhibits received into evidence at 
trial do not clearly support the court's finding that the parties 
had a meeting of the minds as to the purchase price for all of Lot 
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33. Appellee Daryl Hatch did testify that he understood the 
purchase price for all of Lot 33 was to be only $40,000.00. 
However, there is a significant amount of trial testimony, as well 
as the two Earnest Money Sales Agreements, which conflict with 
appellee Daryl Hatch's testimony. This evidence is specifically 
set forth an discussed at length in appellant's initial Brief at 
pp. 9-14. Most significantly, the Trial court concluded at trial 
that there was no meeting of the minds between appellant and 
appellees. The Trial court found both parties to be honest in 
their belief that the terms of the transaction were as each 
testified, yet provided no relief to appellant even though the 
court concluded appellees received a parcel of land valued at 
$80,000.00 for only $40,000.00. (R. 305; 307-308 Tr. 161-162; see 
also Brief of appellant pp. 14-18). 
Ill 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY TO PRECLUDE 
APPELLANT'S EQUITABLE CLAIM OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
In Argument III of their Response Brief, appellees argue 
the Trial court properly refused to consider plaintiff's claims in 
equity because they were barred by the statute of frauds. This 
argument is of no avail to appellees and it is clear appellees 
misstate or do not understand the application of the statute of 
frauds. First, no where in the record does the Trial court state 
that the basis for denying equitable relief to appellant was that 
the statute of frauds precludes equitable relief. 
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Second, the statute of frauds does not apply to 
appellants equitable claim of unjust enrichment as appellees 
argue. Appellees correctly cite the general proposition that for 
a contract for the sell of real property to be enforceable it must 
be in writing. Appellees next claim that H[t]here is absolutely no 
written documentation or corroboration that complies with the 
statute to support a finding that the purchase price was 
$80,000.00. . . . [and that] [l]egal mandate requires that in order 
to succeed in their argument for an additional $40,000.00, such 
agreement must comply with the requirements set forth in U.C.A. 
§25-5-1." (Appellees' Response Brief p. 19). However, appellant's 
unjust enrichment claim is not a legal action to enforce a contract 
for the sell of real property.1 In fact, recovery under unjust 
enrichment presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract 
exists. Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Crt. App. 1987). 
Accordingly, the statute of frauds does not preclude appellant's 
equitable claim of unjust enrichment. 
Finally, throughout Argument III, appellees again 
mischaracterized the evidence presented at trial. Appellees state 
that all the closing documents and various trial exhibits reflect 
Appellant did allege in the alternative an oral contract 
existed between appellant and appellees for the sale of all of Lot 
33 for $80,000.00 and that due to either full or part performance 
of appellant such an agreement was taken outside the statute of 
frauds. The trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of 
law on this particular claim. (See Argument II of appellant's 
initial brief wherein appellant argued the Trial court failed to 
make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusions denying 
Embassy relief). However, this claim was asserted in the 
alternative to and is independent of appellant's unjust enrichment 
claim. 
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that the purchase price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00. Further, 
footnote 3 on page 17 of appellees' Brief reads: 
Embassy's witness Mark Wahlquist also 
testified that only plaintiff's Exhibit 6 
[Earnest Money Agreement] was prepared and 
delivered to Hatches for the sale of the 
property. (R. 55). The document clearly 
state? the 5cge PVJQS W3S to fre $4Q,QQQ,oo. 
(Appellees' Response Brief, p. 17, Fn. 3 (emphasis added))* As 
discussed previously in this Reply Brief and in appellant's initial 
Brief, the only documents introduced into evidence reflecting a 
sale price for Lot 3 3 were the two Earnest Money Sales Agreement. 
And, contrary to appellees' representation, these documents do not 
"clearly" state the sale price for Lot 33 at $40,000.00. Rather, 
the Earnest Money Sales Agreements provide that only "a portion" of 
Lot 33 was to be sold to appellees for $40,000.00 (PI. Exs. 5 and 
6). 
IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT RESTITUTION DAMAGES 
TO APPELLANT ON ITS UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM 
Appellees argue in Argument IV of their Response Brief 
that the Trial court properly refused to grant appellant relief on 
its unjust enrich claim. In so arguing, appellees make two points. 
One, the courts will deny claims for restitution under quasi 
contract when an express contract covers the subject matter of 
litigation. Two, the court was justified in not reforming 
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instruments for the benefit of appellant.2 Appellant addresses 
each of these points as follows. 
First, appellant acknowledges that quasi contract or 
unjust enrichment is generally not applicable where there is a 
clear and express contract covering the subject matter of the 
litigation, and in fact acknowledged this in its citation of the 
law at pp. 16 and 17 of appellant's initial Brief. However, the 
main point in appellant's argument is that there was no clear and 
express contract, satisfying the requirements of mutual assent and 
meeting of the minds, covering the subject matter of this 
litigation. This is supported by both the facts and the Trial 
court's findings. (See Argument I, pp. 8-15 of appellant's Brief). 
Second, appellees' second point in Argument IV is 
referring to reformation of instruments to correct mutual or 
unilateral mistakes. Appellants did allege mutual mistake at trial 
and requested the court reform the parties' contract should the 
court find that such a contract existed. However, this claim was 
alleged in the alternative to and is wholly separate from 
appellant's unjust enrichment claim.3 Accordingly, the law cited 
2Appellees also claim in Argument IV that "appellants would 
like to have the court accept that the parties agreed to enter into 
some kind of conspiracy to deceive the lender into believing that 
the Lot was being purchased for $40,000.00 rather than 
$80,000.00." (Brief of appellees, p. 22). There is absolutely no 
evidence suggesting appellant's knowingly entered into a conspiracy 
to deceive any lending institution of appellees much less evidence 
indicating appellant's would like this court or would have liked 
the Trial court to accept this proposition. 
3It should also be noted the trial court failed to make a 
finding of fact on appellant's reformation of contract claim. (See 
Argument II, pp. 20-26 of Appellant's Brief). 
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by appellees on Reaffirmation is not applicable to an unjust 
enrichment claim which presupposes no express and enforceable 
contract* 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, appellant 
respectfully requests this court reverse the Trial court and enter 
judgment in favor of appellant and against appellees for 
$40,000.00. In the alternative, appellant respectfully requests 
this court to remand this case to the Trial court for specific and 
adequate findings of fact on all of appellant's claims. 
DATED this / /day of January, 1993. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
IEINZ J. MAHLER 
KIRK G. GIBBS 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
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